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CONFRONTATION, EXPERTS, AND RULE
703
Paul C. Giannelli
And then came Crawford v. Washington1—the blockbuster
decision that jettisoned twenty-five years of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. Under Crawford, the critical inquiry
governing admissibility of a hearsay statement became whether it
is “testimonial” and not whether it is reliable. Following the
basic principle articulated in Crawford, the holding five years
later in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts2 became a foregone
conclusion: a crime laboratory report is simply an expert’s
affidavit, and thus clearly testimonial.3 Even the outcome of
Bullcoming v. New Mexico,4 where a surrogate expert introduced
a lab report, could be considered inevitable—at least to Justice
Scalia and the dwindling number of his colleagues who share his
view of testimonial statements. However, Crawford now seems
endangered, as the Court confronts yet another case involving
5
expert testimony: Williams v. Illinois.
 Distinguished University Professor & Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University.
1
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
3
Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, referred to the facts as
a “rather straightforward application of our holding in Crawford.” Id. at
2533.
4
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
5
At the time this essay was submitted, Williams had not yet been
decided. See People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 279 (Ill. 2010) (“The
evidence against the defendant was Lambatos’ opinion [of a DNA match], not
Cellmark’s report, and the testimony was introduced live on the witness
stand. Indeed, the report was not admitted into evidence at all. Rather,
Lambatos testified to her conclusion based upon her own subjective judgment
about the comparison of the Cellmark report with the existing ISP profile.”),
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This essay starts with some thoughts about Federal Evidence
Rules 703 and 7056 and then makes a few observations about the
constitutional issue. My thesis is that any Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence involving these rules must appreciate their
weaknesses. In particular, the Court has failed to appreciate the
relationship between pretrial discovery and meaningful
confrontation at trial. My concerns are practical, not doctrinal.7
I. RULE 703’S RATIONALE
An expert’s opinion is, of course, only as good as the basis
on which it rests. If the jury rejects the basis, it should also
reject the opinion on which it is based. The pre-Rules common
law limited the bases of expert testimony to (1) personal
knowledge of the expert or (2) assumed facts—typically
presented to the expert in the form of a hypothetical question—if
those assumed facts were supported by the record (known as the
“record-facts requirement”). Although the hypothetical question
had long been criticized,8 it had several distinct advantages. It
informed the jury of the basis of an expert’s opinion prior to the
giving of the opinion. In addition, the record-facts requirement
ensured that the basis could be tested by cross-examination when
the evidence concerning those facts was introduced at trial.
A. The Reliability Rationale
Rule 703, along with Rule 705, made the hypothetical
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505).
6
Both rules were recently amended. In December 2011, the “restyled”
Federal Rules of Evidence became effective. No substantive change was
intended. Daniel J. Capra, Preface to WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE:
RESTYLED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, at 1–2 (2d ed. 2011).
7
For an excellent article examining the confrontation issues prior to
Melendez-Diaz, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791
(2007).
8
See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE §5.05[b], at 309 (4th ed. 2007) (“[T]he hypothetical question has
been criticized as a cumbersome and unwieldy device which often precludes
the expert from fully explaining her opinion to the jury.”).
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question optional, but more importantly, these rules made it
possible for an expert to base an opinion on out-of-court
statements if it was typical for experts in the field to reasonably
rely upon such statements. Thus, an expert opinion could be
based on hearsay (nonrecord facts). The drafters offered a
reliability rationale to support Rule 703—i.e., experts relied on
nonrecord facts in their everyday practice and would not do so if
the information was untrustworthy. The advisory committee
provided an example most commonly associated with civil
practice: a physician who makes life and death decisions based
on X-rays, hospital records, blood tests, and other medical
documents.9 Nevertheless, from its inception, Rule 703 was
“controversial,”10 and a 2000 amendment made admissibility of
hearsay more difficult.11
B. The Discovery Rationale
In addition to the reliability rationale, there was another,
perhaps less appreciated, justification for Rules 703 and 705:
9

FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (1975):
In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert
opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the
judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves
when not in court. Thus a physician in his own practice bases his
diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of considerable
variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and
opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital
records, and X-rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but
only with the expenditure of substantial time in producing and
examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician makes
life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation,
expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice
for judicial purposes.
10
See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 176 (2d ed. 1991) (“Rule 703 was a
controversial rule when enacted, and it remains controversial.”).
11
Inadmissibility of the hearsay basis became the default position. The
rule now reads: “But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the
proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative
value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 703.
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comprehensive pretrial discovery. According to the drafters,
Rule 705
assumes that the cross-examiner has the advance
knowledge which is essential for effective crossexamination . . . . Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, as revised, provides for substantial discovery
in this area, obviating in large measure the obstacles
which have been raised in some instances to discovery of
findings, underlying data, and even the identity of the
experts.12
Thus, informed of the basis of an expert’s opinion through
discovery, an opposing party has the opportunity to challenge it.
The combination of these two rationales—reliability and
extensive pretrial discovery—made the enactment of Rules 703
and 705 an attractive reform in civil cases. Simplified trials
coupled with extensive discovery ensured basic fairness.
Discovery in criminal cases, however, is not comprehensive.
Indeed, it is meager, at best. Only a few states authorize pretrial
discovery depositions of witnesses, much less experts.13
Interrogatories are unheard of. Although expert reports are
discoverable in criminal litigation, these reports, as the Supreme
Court reminded us in Melendez-Diaz, often are woefully
inadequate. According to the Court, the laboratory report in that
case
contained only the bare-bones statement that ‘[t]he
substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’ At the time of
trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analysts
performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether
interpreting their results required the exercise of
judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not
14
have possessed.
12

FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee’s note (1975).
See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, ch. 3 (discovery). In
contrast, most jurisdictions have deposition procedures for the preservation of
testimony if the witness might be unavailable for trial. Thus, depositions are
used to preserve the testimony of a party’s own witnesses, not uncover the
testimony of adverse witnesses.
14
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009)
13
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The National Academy of Sciences’ recent report on forensic
science makes the same point.15
A rule justified (at least in part) on the basis of extensive
pretrial discovery is extremely troublesome, to say the least, if
that discovery is not provided. Meaningful “confrontation” of an
in-court expert without adequate discovery is often an
insurmountable task.16
Furthermore, the bare-bones lab reports in criminal cases are
a product of the adversary system, not science. The Journal of
Forensic Sciences, the official publication of the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences, published a symposium on the
ethical responsibilities of forensic scientists in 1989. One Article
discussed a number of unacceptable laboratory reporting
practices, including (1) “preparation of reports containing
minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’
ammunition for cross-examination,” (2) “reporting of findings
without an interpretation on the assumption that if an
interpretation is required it can be provided from the witness
box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some significant point from a report to
(citation omitted).
15
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 21 (2009).
As a general matter, laboratory reports generated as the result of a
scientific analysis should be complete and thorough. They should
contain, at minimum, “methods and materials,” “procedures,”
“results,” “conclusions,” and, as appropriate, sources and
magnitudes of uncertainty in the procedures and conclusions (e.g.,
levels of confidence). Some forensic science laboratory reports meet
this standard of reporting, but many do not. Some reports contain
only identifying and agency information, a brief description of the
evidence being submitted, a brief description of the types of analysis
requested, and a short statement of the results (e.g., “the greenish,
brown plant material in item #1 was identified as marijuana”), and
they include no mention of methods or any discussion of
measurement uncertainties.
Id.
16
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (“[I]t is difficult to
test expert testimony at trial without advance notice and preparation.”); see
also Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA,
44 VAND. L. REV. 791, 798–99 (1991) (discussing the inadequate discovery
of expert evidence in criminal cases).
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trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner.”17 In other words, the
reports are intended to make the trial confrontation of the expert
more difficult.
As an example, imagine that a forensic pathologist testifies
18
that a person died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning.
This opinion is based partly on an autopsy, which revealed a
cherry-red skin color that is indicative of carbon monoxide
poisoning, and the absence of any other cause of death. This
personal knowledge is supplemented by two other sources of
information. The first is the report of a toxicologist, which
revealed the presence of quantifiable amounts of carbon
monoxide in tissue samples taken from the decedent’s organs
during the autopsy. The second is a police report regarding the
scene where the body was found, which revealed that a gas
stove was on and the windows were shut when the police
entered the decedent’s apartment.
In a life insurance case involving a death benefit, Rules 703
and 705 would permit the pathologist to testify that the cause of
death was carbon monoxide poisoning, without first disclosing
the bases of her opinion.19 Neither the toxicologist (another
expert) nor the first police responder (lay witness) would be
required to testify.20 In contrast, the common law required both
to testify at some point in the trial in order for the hypothetical
question to be valid.
Under the discovery rules in civil litigation, the opposing
party would be entitled to a comprehensive expert report,21
17

Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic
Scientist: Exploring the Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989) (Lucas
was the Director of the Centre of Forensic Sciences, Ministry of the Solicitor
General, Toronto, Ontario).
18
This example is based on State v. David, 22 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1942).
19
On direct examination, the pathologist may be asked to provide the
basis of her opinion because it would be more persuasive (not because of any
evidence rule).
20
As a practical matter, the police officer would probably be called as a
witness because his testimony is needed independently of the expert’s
opinion.
21
The rule requires that the report must contain:
(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and
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which might spur that party to retain its own expert. In addition,
the opposing attorney could depose all three participants—the
pathologist, the toxicologist, and the police officer.
Interrogatories would probably precede these depositions. In
contrast, in a criminal case, say for murder, most of this
discovery is simply not authorized. As noted above, testing the
reliability of the expert’s opinion is extremely difficult without
pretrial discovery.
Now recall the hearsay problem inherent in Rule 703. The
2000 amendment to Rule 703 makes non-disclosure of the
hearsay basis of an expert’s opinion the default position. This
provides some protection, but the opposing party (i.e., the
accused) is still disadvantaged. The only means of attacking the
pathologist’s opinion may require disclosure of the hearsay basis
on cross-examination, which the cross-examiner may not know
ahead of time because of inadequate discovery. Moreover,
disclosure may carry a high price: it might inform the jury that
another expert (the toxicologist) supports the pathologist’s
opinion regarding the cause of death. An instruction telling the
jury to limit its consideration of this information to a nonhearsay purpose would most likely be ineffective.22 The jury
the basis and reasons for them; (ii) the facts or data considered by
the witness in forming them; (iii) any exhibits that will be used to
summarize or support them; (iv) the witness’s qualifications,
including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years;
(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the
witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) a
statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony
in the case.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)–(vi).
22
Professor Mnookin has rejected the argument that the bases can be
offered for a non-hearsay purpose:
The problem with this argument is that notwithstanding its
frequent invocation by courts, it makes almost no sense. To be sure,
the jury might have better grounds for evaluating the expert’s
testimony if it hears about the data upon which the expert relied for
her conclusion. But part of a rational evaluation of the expert will
thus entail an evaluation of her sources—which will inevitably
involve a judgment about the likelihood that the sources themselves
are valid and worthy of reliance. In other words, to decide how
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would probably not understand, much less adhere to, such an
instruction in this context.23
In sum, Rules 703 and 705 are problematic as evidence rules in
criminal cases without even considering Confrontation Clause issues.
II. RULE 703’S “REASONABLE RELIANCE” REQUIREMENT
Rule 703 provides: “If experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an
opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion
to be admitted.” What is considered “reasonable reliance” varies
from field to field. For example, an arson investigator’s opinion on
the origin and cause of a fire may be based in part on statements of
eyewitnesses.24 In contrast, a psychiatrist who testifies in an
insanity case may base her opinion in part on the post-crime
statements of the defendant’s family and friends.25 Accordingly, the
“reasonable reliance” requirement requires close scrutiny.
much to credit the expert’s sources, the jury should, logically, first
assess the odds that they are reliable. And what is this but a
judgment about the likely truth of their contents? Using the
information for the permissible purpose of evaluating the expert thus
necessarily requires a preliminary determination about the
information’s truth. The permitted purpose is therefore neither
separate nor separable from an evaluation of the truth of the
statement’s contents.
Mnookin, supra note 7, at 816.
23
See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction.” (citation omitted)); Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d
883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962) (“[I]f you throw a skunk into the jury box, you
can’t instruct the jury not to smell it.”).
24
See United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d 392, 395–96 (7th Cir. 1987)
(“[H]earsay and third-party observations that are of a type normally relied
upon by an expert in the field are properly utilized by such an expert in
developing an expert opinion. . . . [The expert] presented uncontroverted
evidence that interviews with many witnesses to a fire are a standard
investigatory technique in cause and origin inquiries.” (citing FED. R. EVID.
703; United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 301–03 (7th Cir. 1981))).
25
These witnesses may provide important information about the
accused’s conduct leading up to the crime.
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A. Supervising Toxicologist
A pre-Crawford case, Reardon v. Manson,26 illustrates the
kinds of problems that the “reasonable reliance” requirement
raises. In that case, a toxicologist, Dr. Reading, testified about
the identity of a seized substance (marijuana) based on tests
performed by a chemist working under his supervision. The
Second Circuit upheld the practice: “Expert reliance upon the
output of others does not necessarily violate the confrontation
clause where the expert is available for questioning concerning
27
the nature and reasonableness of his reliance.”
Reardon raises numerous issues. First, the term “under the
supervision” is troublesome. In 1983, Saks and Duizend
published a study on the use of scientific evidence. Part of their
investigation involved case studies of different forensic
techniques. The drug case in their study is the Reardon
prosecution. They comment:
In this case, the laboratory in question had three
doctorate-level toxicologists and 22 or 24 lesscredentialed chemists. The volume of tests performed
(about 20,000 annually) left the toxicologist an average
of only a few minutes per day to attend to any given test.
Is this adequate involvement to justify testifying to the
findings?28
In other words, the toxicologist was “supervising” fifty cases

26

Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986). The case had a long
legal history before it was heard by the Second Circuit. The Connecticut
Supreme Court upheld the conviction on appeal. State v. Reardon, 376 A.2d
65, 67, 69 (Conn. 1977). On habeas review, the Federal District Court for
the District of Connecticut ruled that the defendant’s right to confrontation
had been violated. Reardon v. Manson, 491 F. Supp. 982, 988–89 (D. Conn.
1980). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded on procedural
grounds. Reardon v. Manson, 644 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1981). On
remand, the district court once again found a confrontation violation, Reardon
v. Manson, 617 F. Supp. 932 (D. Conn. 1985), and then the Second Circuit
reversed on the merits, Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986).
27
Reardon, 806 F.2d at 42.
28
MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 49 (1983).
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a day. As the federal district court noted, “[I]t strains credulity
to assert that Dr. Reading could personally ‘supervise’ some 50
of these tests daily.”29 Here, the line between a supervising
expert and a surrogate witness, as in Bullcoming, is blurred, if
not erased.
An understanding of the laboratory procedures demonstrates
how this blurring occurred.30 According to the toxicologist, his
laboratory used three different tests to identify marijuana: (1) a
microscopic test to determine the presence of cystolithic hairs
that are characteristic of marijuana,31 (2) a chemical color test,
32
and (3) thin layer chromatography (TLC). Dr. Reading
admitted, however, that his opinion was not based on the first
test; he “never personally examined the substance under the
microscope.”33 He further testified that the TLC and color tests
were sufficient to identify marijuana. In other words, Dr.
Reading claimed that a microscopic test required by his
laboratory’s protocol, that he presumably directed his
subordinate to perform, was unnecessary!
Dr. Reading also explained that the TLC and color tests
“were conducted out of his immediate presence by laboratory
chemists under his supervision and on oral or hand-written

29

Reardon, 617 F. Supp. at 936.
“The briefs and the opinions focused on the laboratory procedures,
both technical and administrative, without real evidence of the workloads and
methods, and reached various differing conclusions about the directness of
the supervising toxicologist’s observations under the given circumstances.”
SAKS & VAN DUIZEND, supra note 28, at 49.
31
See Bruce Stein et al., An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used
by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their Analysts, 1973 WIS.
L. REV. 727, 771 (“Cystolith hairs are small hairs on the leaves resembling
‘bear claws.’ . . . The major difficulty with this test is that many plants have
cystolith hairs. . . . In the subclass dicotyledon, . . . 600 species
. . . contained cystolith hairs.”).
32
State v. Reardon, 376 A.2d 65, 66 (Conn. 1977) (“Dr. Reading
testified at length . . . as to the manner in which drug identifications were
conducted in the state toxicological laboratory in this and other similar cases.
A microscopic test, a thin-layer chromatography test and a chemical test were
conducted.”).
33
Reardon v. Manson, 491 F. Supp. 982, 984 (D. Conn. 1980).
30
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reports from [the] chemists.”34 Therefore, he lacked personal
knowledge about issues such as the chain of custody and
adherence to proper procedures during the time the subordinate
had possession of the evidence.35 Notably, these closely resemble
the practices condemned in Bullcoming.
Second, the procedure sanctioned in Reardon misleads a jury
into believing that a well-trained toxicologist with a Ph.D. has
performed the tests personally, when that is not the case. The
district court noted that substitution of the toxicologist for the
chemist had become “routine” in Connecticut. According to that
court,
it is likely that the State was hoping to take strategic
advantage of their absence. By not producing the actual
chemists, the State effectively screened these lessexperienced witnesses from the rigors of crossexamination. Moreover, in their place, the State
substituted a witness with great experience both on the
witness stand and in the practice of forensic medicine,
whose testimony . . . was buttressed by his doctorate
degree.36
This practice may be more misleading than it first appears.
The Second Circuit refers to the subordinates as “chemists,”37
which one might assume is someone with a bachelor’s degree in
chemistry. But this is not necessarily true. The district court
pointed out that the “record is absolutely devoid of any evidence
as to the qualifications of the chemists who actually performed
the tests.”38 A more accurate description may be the one used by
39
Saks and Duizend, who referred to them as “technician[s].”
Finally, discovery is once again a problem. The Second
Circuit justified its Reardon holding in part on the defendant’s
34

Id.
“As to other tests where he himself observed the results of the
experiments, he still was required to assume that the substances tested were
in fact the substances in question, that the tests had been performed correctly,
and that the appropriate standards had been used.” Id. at 985.
36
Id. at 987.
37
Reardon, 806 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1986).
38
Reardon, 617 F. Supp. 932, 935 (D. Conn. 1985).
39
SAKS & VAN DUIZEND, supra note 28, at 49.
35
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pretrial access to the underlying data, asserting that in-court
confrontation of a supervising expert is sufficient “where the
defendants have access to the same sources of information
through subpoena or otherwise.”40 The “otherwise” presumably
refers to discovery but, as discussed above, such discovery often
does not exist.
In sum, the “supervision” cases should not all be treated
alike. Reardon seems only a step (and a very short one, at that)
away from what the Court found unacceptable in Bullcoming.
B. DNA Cases
Even DNA cases are not all the same. In the typical case
only one laboratory is involved. However, Williams is not the
typical DNA case. The crime scene analysis was farmed out to a
private DNA lab, Cellmark. Although Sandra Lambatos, a state
DNA analyst, testified that she made an independent assessment
of the Cellmark report, she also testified that she was not
familiar with Cellmark’s protocols and that Cellmark had
different matching rules than her lab. Moreover, Lambatos was
incapable of answering important questions about the Cellmark
laboratory. Among these questions were those about personnel
and procedures. According to DNA Advisory Board
requirements, each DNA analyst must undergo proficiency
testing41—how did the Cellmark expert perform on these
proficiency tests? Each laboratory must undergo audits42 and
40

Reardon, 806 F.2d at 42.
The DNA Identification Act of 1994 required proficiency testing and the
creation of a DNA Advisory Board to set standards. 42 U.S.C. § 14131 (2006);
see also DNA ADVISORY BD., QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC
DNA TESTING LABORATORIES 13.1 (1999) [hereinafter DAB STANDARD],
available at http://www.cstl.nist.gov/strbase/dabqas.htm (“Examiners and
other personnel designated by the technical manager or leader who are
actively engaged in DNA analysis shall undergo, at regular intervals of not to
exceed 180 days, external proficiency testing in accordance with the
standards. Such external testing shall be an open proficiency testing
program.”).
42
DAB STANDARD 15.1 (“The laboratory shall conduct audits annually
in accordance with the standards outlined herein.”); Id. at 15.2 (“Once every
two years, a second agency shall participate in the annual audit.”).
41
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keep a corrective action file43—what kind of problems had
Cellmark experienced, as recorded in the corrective action file?
If confrontation is going to be meaningful, the defense must
have the opportunity to confront a witness who knows the
answers to critical questions, such as those left unanswered in
Williams. It also needs access to such information before trial.
III. NOTICE-AND-DEMAND STATUTES
One final point deserves mention. The adequacy of pretrial
discovery has an impact on a related Crawford expert issue. In
Melendez-Diaz, the Court seemed to approve one type of noticeand-demand statute.44 Such statutes permit the admission of a
laboratory report if the defense is notified that the prosecution
intends to introduce the report and the defense fails to demand
the presence of the analyst as a witness.45 In other words, failure
to demand the analyst’s presence constitutes a waiver of the
right of confrontation. Defense counsel, however, cannot
intelligently waive the presence of the analyst unless she
understands the basis of the analysis. In short, waiving a client’s
right of confrontation without knowing far more about the
43

Id. at 14.1 (requiring corrective action procedures “whenever
proficiency-testing discrepancies and/or analytical errors are detected”).
44
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 n.3 (2009)
(“The right to confrontation may, of course, be waived, including by failure
to object to the offending evidence; and States may adopt procedural rules
governing the exercise of such objections.”); Id. at 2541 n.12 (“It suffices to
say that what we have referred to as the ‘simplest form [of] notice-anddemand statutes,’ is constitutional; that such provisions are in place in a
number of States; and that in those States, and in other States that require
confrontation without notice-and-demand, there is no indication that the dire
consequences predicted by the dissent have materialized.” (citation omitted)).
45
The Court has yet to directly consider notice-and-demand statutes. In
Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (per curiam), the Court vacated
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and “remand[ed] the case for
further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion in Melendez-Diaz.”
Although that statute gave the accused the “right to call” the forensic analyst
“as a witness,” it did not require the Commonwealth to call the analyst in its
case-in-chief. See Cypress v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 206, 208 (Va.
2010). On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional. Id. at 211–13.
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analysis than is typically provided in criminal discovery would
be ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,46 a 1987 decision, a plurality of
the Supreme Court took the position that the right of
confrontation is a trial right and “does not include the power to
require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that
might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.”47 It
seems likely, given this holding, that the Supreme Court may
continue to fail to account for the inadequacy of pretrial
discovery in its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The Court
should revisit this issue. The provision of adequate discovery is
critical to meaningful trial confrontation.

46

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
Id. at 52–53. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, who cast the
deciding vote, disagreed with the plurality: “In my view, there might well be
a confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied pretrial access to
information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a crucial
prosecution witness.” Id. at 61–62 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). In dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall
agreed:
The creation of a significant impediment to the conduct of crossexamination thus undercuts the protections of the Confrontation
Clause, even if that impediment is not erected at the trial itself. In
this case, the foreclosure of access to prior statements of the
testifying victim deprived the defendant of material crucial to the
conduct of cross-examination.
Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Scalia dissented on
procedural grounds. Id. at 72–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–78 (1985) (rejecting the Court of
Appeals’ right of confrontation approach in favor of a due process analysis).
47

